

PROJECT 10078 RECORD CARD

1. DATE 22 Jan 52	2. LOCATION HENANA, ALASKA	10. CONCLUSIONS <input type="checkbox"/> Was Balloon <input type="checkbox"/> Probably Balloon <input type="checkbox"/> Possibly Balloon <input type="checkbox"/> Was Aircraft <input type="checkbox"/> Probably Aircraft <input type="checkbox"/> Possibly Aircraft <input type="checkbox"/> Was Astronomical <input type="checkbox"/> Probably Astronomical <input type="checkbox"/> Possibly Astronomical <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Unusual atmospheric conditions <input type="checkbox"/> Insufficient Data for Evaluation <input type="checkbox"/> Unknown
3. DATE OF PICKUP Local 22/0120 AST GMT 22/1020 Z	4. TYPE OF OBSERVATION <input type="checkbox"/> Ground-Visual <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Ground-Radar <input type="checkbox"/> Air-Visual <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Air-Intercept Radar	
5. PHOTOS <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No	6. SOURCE Varied Military Personnel	
7. LENGTH OF OBSERVATION --	8. NUMBER OF OBJECTS 1	9. COURSE Varied
10. BRIEF SUMMARY OF SIGHTING At approximately 1020Z, 22 Jan 52, ground radar site picked up an object traveling at estimated speed of 1350-1500 knots. The radar site lost the object and picked it up again at 1052Z. At 1200Z, F-94 a/c picked up a target and tried to locate it with negative results.		11. COMMENTS 1. Several targets were located the radar scopes but objects were not seen visually. 2. It is believed that the various pick-ups on the radar screens were due to abnormal atmospheric conditions.



DOWNING  
DECE

SECURITY INFORMATION

HEADQUARTERS  
FIFTH AIR FORCE  
APO 942, 7/4  
CANTON, MASSACHUSETTS

TO:

Commanding General, 1st Air Force, 1st Air Force Base, 1st Air Force

FROM:

Commanding General,  
1st Air Force, 1st Air Force Base,  
1st Air Force

It is requested that immediate and detailed intelligence investigation be conducted of the events concerning crash of 1st January 1952 at East-Manning, Iowa.

It is suggested that the possibility of a sabotage attack concerning the pilotless plane during the period that radar returns were reported be explored. It is believed that there are competent individuals on this subject available at the University of Akron.

BY COMMAND OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL

DATE:

25 JAN 1952

25 JAN 1952

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTH AIR FORCE, 1st Air Force Base, 1st Air Force

TO:

Commanding General, 1st Air Force, 1st Air Force Base, 1st Air Force

1. An intelligence team of two (2) officers from the 1st Air Force Intelligence Service Squadron proceeded to 1st Air Force Base on 25 January 1952 for the purpose of conducting the investigation reported in paragraph one (1) above.

2. A complete report will be forwarded your headquarters upon completion of this investigation.

FOR THE COMMANDING GENERAL

*[Signature]*  
Major General  
1st Air Force

MAJ GEN  
1st Air Force

*[Handwritten notes]*  
1st Air Force



UNCLASSIFIED  
DOWNGRADED  
DECLASSIFIED

COMBINATION  
INVESTIGATION  
RESEARCH / ANALYSIS / RISK  
APO 942, U. S. AIR FORCE

FROM:

Intelligence Investigation Team 17

TO:

Commanding Officer  
XXVIII Air Refueling Wing, Strategic Squadron  
Hickam AFB, Hawaii  
APO 942, U. S. AIR FORCE

1. Reference is made to report of track 17, dated 17 January 1972, concerning unidentified track 17 which was reported by US-101.

2. This report contains reports, instructions and directions to the Commanding Officer of the XXVIII Air Refueling Wing and the XXVIII Air Refueling Wing to conduct an investigation and to make investigations by sending an intelligence team to Hickam AFB to investigate the nature and source involved in a report of track 17.

3. Upon completion of this investigation and study, a detailed report (four copies) will be forwarded to the Commanding Officer.

BY COMMAND OF HEADQUARTERS XXVIII AIR REFUELING WING

MAJOR  
APO 942, U. S. AIR FORCE

RECEIVED 17 JAN 1972

*Thomas J. ...*  
CAPT  
USAF

*...*  
17 JAN 1972







SECRET

Subject: Investigation of Radar Station at Fire Island  
12 January 1952 (Cont.)

of obtaining radar echoes from targets with Air Force radar sets. It was concluded extremely unlikely that a radar set would produce a radar echo on radar sets not specifically modified for this purpose.

5. The Pilot and Radar Observer on an F-34 aircraft with this equipment to the target area can look to find out whether tracking a similar target. The statements of the above personnel are also attached hereto.

6. In the case of the incident, the radar station at Fire Island was located at about 10 miles from the target area. The possibility exists that interference caused by this radar may have had some bearing on the reported incident.

7. Recommendation: It is recommended that a report be prepared, and that the committee be kept advised of any further information received. The possible effect of interference from Fire Island station.

5 Incl.  
Statements

*[Signature]*  
CHARLES H. WALKER  
Major, USAF  
Commander

*[Signature]*      *[Signature]*  
Investigating Officer      Chief, USAF      Captain, USAF

SECURITY INFORMATION

140076  
3















1417  
NORTH BRITAIN, BRITISH AIR FORCE  
1417, U.S. AIR FORCE

Date 11/27/49

SWITCH

At 10:52, 22 (Group 1) 502 Lt. Clifford E. Barrett, pilot of # 44 42574, on an altitude alert, was assigned an individual target that was traveling at a very high rate of speed. We were circling at about 10,000 feet. I called Altitude Alert to the controller and was ordered to call Crane and fly to Point which is 1/2 mile east on a heading of 215°. Crane came in and advised the same thing and we went west to 20,000 feet to get in a better fix. Crane had another pilot and vectored us so that we could intercept. The target lead and we ordered back to 20,000 feet and heading 215°. The Radar Observer advised an indication of a target at about 10 to the same range by heading was approximately 15% of the time. I had an indication of lock on but the lock is apparently an indication of reflection. Later I learned that the Radar attempted lock on and must have succeeded momentarily, because he immediately went on and controlled in an effort to stay on the target. I started a one turn to go back around when Crane vectored us to the northeast. No other pilot was picked up by Crane and we followed in and down the north side of the Alaska Range. At about 10:55, the target was 10,000 miles from lead on a course of 215°. Crane then advised that the target would fly back down lead on a heading of 215° and we would be released to launch from our lead.

Approximately 10 miles south of Point, the Radar Observer picked up a target at 20,000 yards, 10% low, and about dead ahead. The Radar definitely determined that it was a target. I was still at 20,000 feet and "Sawyer" indicated about 100 miles. I rolled over into a slight dive and centered the error circle and saw. The range circle indicated an over-sight speed of at least one hundred knots. I dropped five inches and vectored back slightly from the 215° I was carrying. Hedge at this time was between 10,000 and 15,000 yards. I kept the target centered all the way down. At 2,000 yards range the range circle started decreasing rapidly and I was still indicating over 100 knots overtake. At 500 yards range I pulled up slightly and the target moved to not more than 10% low. The range rate decreased to the point that I didn't have the time to do anything other than watch the range. I was pulling up and the target broke lock with the target indicating 5% low. The indication of speed was 250. The altitude was 20,000 feet. I made two 180° turns and came back through the same area without sighting anything. I then turned in curve and flew out about a minute before turning back to search the area again. No other indications were made of anything in the area.

11/27/49  
1417











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APPENDIX VII

Nenana, Alaska - 22 January 1952

I. DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

At 1020Z on 22 January 1952, a radar station at Murphy's Dome, Alaska, observed an unidentified radar return. The target was going away from the station on an azimuth of 210°, at a speed of about 1500 mph when first observed but appeared to reverse its direction and returned toward the station. The set was adjusted so that the target could be observed as it closed in on the station but after this change was made the target was again observed, however, at about its original location, and again going away from the station. Just before it faded, it appeared to be making a turn back toward the station.

At 1030Z an F-94 was airborne to search for the object. At this time the object was going away from the station at a high rate of speed so the F-94 was told to orbit. About this time the ground station lost contact with the object but continued to track the F-94.

At about 1100Z as the F-94 was approaching Nenana (near Fairbanks), the radar observer in the F-94 observed two targets, one faint and one bright. The aircraft was at 30,000 ft. and the target was at 25,000 ft. The targets crossed from right to left and appeared to be traveling slowly and as the F-94 approached the target a high rate of closure was indicated. The contact was lost at a range of 200 yards.

Approximately one hour later, again near Nenana, another contact was made by the F-94. In this instance the target was kept dead ahead and level. When the target was at a range of 200 yards, the pilot pulled up and the target was lost. The rate of closure during the run was 100 knots even though the F-94 had flaps down. No other contacts were made and the aircraft was released at 1210Z.

During the two airborne contacts the F-94 was being tracked by the ground station but the object was not being picked up.

The weather was clear but no visual sighting was made. On the same night, the same crew had visually identified a C-54, a C-47, and a small civilian aircraft from 300 to 500 yards. There were no clouds in the sky but it was a dark night.

No malfunctions were found in either radar set.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10



CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

As I have previously mentioned, I am before you on my investigations  
to identify the cause of the crash. I am sure that it might be  
caused by the crew.

WILLIAM H. HART  
Captain, Radar Observer, All-Weather

This is a certified true copy

*William H. Hart*  
WILLIAM H. HART  
Captain, Radar Observer, All-Weather

DOWNGRADED BY  
DEC 1978

SECURITY INFORMATION

CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED







CONFIDENTIAL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED  
DATE 12-15-2011 BY 60322 UCBAW/STP

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, FBI  
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

[The body of the memorandum contains several paragraphs of text that are extremely faint and illegible due to the quality of the scan. The text appears to be a formal report or communication.]

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
[Illegible Name]  
[Illegible Title]

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DOJ

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1/1/00

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
[Illegible Name]



44TH FIGHTER INTERCEPTOR SQUADRON  
14TH AIR FORCE WING  
APO 701, U. S. AIR FORCE

Summary

25 January 1952

Richard B. Peterson, Captain, USAF, 11438 A, while flying intercept missions from Davis Air Force Base have picked up and "locked on" with our airborne radar set, what we called "ghost targets".

In one particular mission, we locked onto a target dead ahead and high at approximately 17,000 yards on two different occasions and in relative the same track on was maintained on the 10-15 minutes with no change in the target position. Investigation revealed no aircraft flying in that area. Weather was not a factor. Missions were flown during the period of May 26 to June 9, 1951.

Richard B. Peterson  
Richard B. Peterson  
Captain, USAF  
11438 A

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

*Richard B. Peterson*  
RICHARD B. PETERSON  
CAPTAIN USAF

SECURITY INFORMATION

Jan 11 1952

FILE #







174100Z JAN 52  
FM JCRC/AFSA  
TO DIRECTOR, FBI WASH DC  
INFO CIA, US AIR FORCE

SECRET  
174100Z JAN 52

21 January 1952

STATEMENT  
(James G. Lange, Captain)

### STATEMENT OF INFORMATION

I presented a theory which would tend to explain the rapid moving aircraft sighted over Mt. McKinley. I present this as a possibility, though I would find it hard to duplicate the condition.

By coincidence, on that night we stopped our antenna for maintenance some time between 1000Z and 1015Z with the beam pointed on Mt. McKinley, or within 2° of that peak. This was known since we had had reason to check the bearing shortly after stopping rotation. It is as we know, none of the station or frequencies were changed until some time between 1045Z and 1100Z. These times coincide closely with the time of initial pickup and final fade of the plane.

Three things are necessary to give this result:

1. Our transmitter frequencies must, in at least one case, be the same as one of their receivers.
2. Our antenna must be pointed at a target (P.K.) which can be seen by both sides.
3. The prime reception frequencies of the two sets should be nearly equal (almost identical).

Condition 1 is probably present at least once a week by the nature of average time each transmitter is operated over a limited frequency range and the two systems use the same range of frequency.

But, though close, it is improbable that they would be quite so identical. However, such a condition is always possible.

Our antenna was stopped on Mt. McKinley which can be seen by both sides.

The conditions could be possible, and even though unlikely, it is felt that the possibility should be considered.

The reason the track appeared to come rather than as a line may be that, even though our beam has considerable gain that could reflect energy to the other side, the receiver on earth could have been an antenna in their antenna by way of several ionospheric reflections. A fairly close together would give them a poor plot.

James G. Lange

*[Handwritten signature]*  
174100Z JAN 52



The distance from the other side was always the same and in line from that side to the battery, the reflecting point.



Drawn from our base  
 0.00 typical slope of K<sub>2</sub>  
 K<sub>2</sub> can only receive our  
 signal when based on K<sub>1</sub>  
 McKelvey, the common  
 reflecting surface.

Frequency:

VI	2572 Mc
VII	3005 Mc
SU	2724 Mc
SI	2629 Mc
VI	10 records

K<sub>2</sub> reported that VI was  
 on 2572 also at that time  
 (VI was 2572)

Coincidence of all returns at a point under a sweep is the result  
 of very close fit.

The more of the target between sweeps is the result of slight  
 change in fit or distance in fit.

W. J. HARRIS  
 Radio Service Representative  
 General Electric Co.

General Electric Co.  
*W. J. Harris*  
 Radio Service Representative  
 General Electric Co.



HEADQUARTERS  
ALASKA AIR COMMAND  
WAINWORTH AIR FORCE BASE  
110 9th, U. S. AIR FORCE

UNCLASSIFIED  
STATEMENT

31 January 1964

The items following the number one, we attempted to duplicate the results but without success. We stopped the antenna at nine o'clock and changed transmitter frequency over a considerable range. No pings were received by 2-0.

15/ JAMES S. HARRIS  
Field Service Representative  
General Electric Co.

Approved for Release (S)

*James S. Harris*  
Field Service Representative  
General Electric Co.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY INFORMATION

1-11-64

*James S. Harris*  
1-11-64



# DISPOSITION FORM

UNCLASSIFIED

Subject: Comments on Incident of 7-15-41  
Date: January 22 and 23, 1942

Office: *Foreign*      Date: *February 1942*

From the evidence presented by the various participants in the case, it is concluded that the cause of the incident was the failure of the participants to follow the instructions of the command. It is noted that the possibility of a misunderstanding of the instructions was not ruled out. The instructions were given by the command and it is concluded that the participants should have followed them. It is recommended that the following actions be taken:

1. The command should be advised of the results of the investigation and the reasons for the findings. 2. The participants should be advised of the results of the investigation and the reasons for the findings. 3. The command should be advised of the results of the investigation and the reasons for the findings.

It is recommended that the following actions be taken:

1. The command should be advised of the results of the investigation and the reasons for the findings. 2. The participants should be advised of the results of the investigation and the reasons for the findings. 3. The command should be advised of the results of the investigation and the reasons for the findings.

It is recommended that the following actions be taken:

1. The command should be advised of the results of the investigation and the reasons for the findings. 2. The participants should be advised of the results of the investigation and the reasons for the findings. 3. The command should be advised of the results of the investigation and the reasons for the findings.

*James H. [Signature]*  
Special Agent in Charge

*[Signature]*  
Special Agent in Charge

*[Signature]*  
Special Agent in Charge

FILE

DISPATCH



UNCLASSIFIED

MEMORANDUM  
FOR THE RECORD  
SUBJECT: [Illegible]

DATE: [Illegible]

BY: [Illegible]

BY: [Illegible]  
([Illegible], [Illegible])

[Illegible text block]

([Illegible])  
[Illegible]  
[Illegible]

[Illegible]  
[Illegible Signature]  
[Illegible]  
[Illegible]

SECURITY INFORMATION

Page 11

Ad 16  
[Illegible]



## II. STATUS OF INVESTIGATION

Report by Electronics Branch of ATIC.

Target being slanted instead of perpendicular to radii from radar station indicates possible weather target. Speed may be accounted for by the momentary appearance and disappearance of other weather targets. Further explanation cannot be made.

## III. CONCLUSIONS

Target caused by weather phenomena.

1 1 1

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10



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4/10

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FLIGHT TRACK  
RECORDED AIR 50

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SUNNY

FLIGHT TRACK  
RECORDED  
SCALE 1:100,000

FLIGHT TRACK  
RECORDED  
SCALE 1:100,000

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DECLASSIFIED AT 10 YEARS  
DOE DIR 6.101

22



22 Jan, 1952

NENANA, ALASKA



APPENDIX II

Nenana, Alaska - 22 January 1952

I. DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

At 1020Z on 22 January 1952, a radar station at Murphy's Dome, Alaska, observed an unidentified radar return. The target was going away from the station on an azimuth of 210°, at a speed of about 1500 mph when first observed but appeared to reverse its direction and returned toward the station. The set was adjusted so that the target could be observed as it closed in on the station but after this change was made the target was no longer observed. Seven minutes later (approximately 1030Z) the target was again observed, however, at about its original location, and again going away from the station. Just before it faded it appeared to be making a turn back toward the station.

At 1030Z an F-94 was airborne to search for the object. At this time the object was going away from the station at a high rate of speed so the F-94 was told to orbit. About this time the ground station lost contact with the object but continued to track the F-94.

At about 1100Z as the F-94 was approaching Nenana (near Fairbanks), the radar observer in the F-94 observed two targets, one faint and one bright. The aircraft was at 30,000 ft., and the target was at 25,000 ft. The targets crossed from right to left and appeared to be traveling slowly and as the F-94 approached the target a high rate of closure was indicated. The contact was lost at a range of 200 yards.

Approximately one hour later, again near Nenana, another contact was made by the F-94. In this instance the target was kept dead ahead and level. When the target was at a range of 200 yards, the pilot pulled up and the target was lost. The rate of closure during the run was 100 knots even though the F-94 had flaps down. No other contacts were made and the aircraft was released at 1210Z.

During the two airborne contacts the F-94 was being tracked by the ground station but the object was not being picked up.

The weather was clear but no visual sighting was made. On the same night, the same crew had visually identified a C-54, a C-47, and a small civilian aircraft from 300 to 500 yards. There were no clouds in the sky but it was a dark night.

No malfunctions were found in either radar set.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
1990 01/25 500210



~~SECRET~~  
UNCLASSIFIED

**II. STATUS OF INVESTIGATION**

Report is being studied by the Electronics Branch of ATIC.

**III. CONCLUSIONS**

Pending.

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

13

T52-10889

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~



AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM (1-1-52)	REPORT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES
Intelligence Directorate, Hq AAG	IR-1-52	2	3	

At approximately 1020Z, 22 January 1952, Radar Site F-2 made an original contact with an unusual target in the area of Nenana (Point "Jig"). The scope presented the target clearly but on a slant of 15° - 20° instead of perpendicular to radii, the normal manner of presentation. The speed was estimated at 1350 to 1500 knots.

At 1030Z an F-94 (pilot, Lt C.E. Garrett; radar operator, Capt V.D. Ramey) was airborne and vectored to Nenana. F-2 lost the target prior to the aircraft's arrival in the vicinity, so the aircraft was given a patrol mission along the Alaskan Range. At approximately 1052Z, F-2 again contacted this target and held it for about one (1) minute. Due to the fact that the target was outbound in relation to F-2 and to the aircraft and moving at a high rate of speed, no attempt was made to vector the aircraft on the target.

At approximately 1200Z, while the aircraft was en route to Ladd Air Force Base, the radar operator received indication of a target in the Nenana area. Finding the target ahead and low (approximately 24,000 feet altitude), the pilot made an intercept pass from 24,000 yards to 200 yards with a good target on the radar scopes. The overtaking speed was better than 100 knots.

At 200 yards the pilot pulled up and over the apparent target location. Aircraft speed on the run was approximately 250 knots indicated. After going over the target, two (2) 360° turns were made and a search of the area conducted for several minutes without making further radar contact or visual sighting.

During this time F-2 was able to track the F-94 but had no other target visible. The F-94 landed at 1225Z. The weather in the Fairbanks area during this period - 1030Z to 1230Z, 22 January 1952 - was: ceiling unlimited; visibility 15 miles or more. The pilot reported that the Aurora Borealis was brilliant but not exceptionally so.

A pilot and a ground observer reported what appeared to be a comet or meteor to the southwest of Ladd Air Force Base, approximately four (4) hours earlier, this date.

On 23 January 1952, from 1020Z to 1140Z, the same F-94 (pilot, Lt R.R. Diment; radar operator, Lt C.A. Hayward) was dispatched on a mission to see if a target similar to that of 22 January could be found. At approximately 1050Z a radar contact was made at 20,000 yards. The aircraft at this time was between Clear and Nenana at 18,000 feet in a shallow climb. An intercept run was begun and followed through to 2700 yards, at which time the target disappeared. The overtaking speed was more than 100 knots, the aircraft indicating 230 knots.

After radar contact was lost, further search was made in this area. Contact was not made either by radar or visual observation. The weather was clear, with visibility unlimited; the pilot reported that the Aurora Borealis was very active and in his opinion, unusual.

At approximately 1030W, 23 January 1952, a team checked the aircraft, utilized in these flights, for radiation, but with negative results. Due to the time lapse between the flight on 22 January and the time at which this check was made, it is possible that the negative report is not of value.

Dr. C.T. Elvey, Director of the Geophysical Institute, University of Alaska, stated, in effect, that in his opinion it is unlikely that a meteor would produce an indication on a radar set that is not specifically designed or modified for that purpose.

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 DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS  
 DOD DIR 000019

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE PROVISIONS OF TITLE 18, U.S.C. AND IS TO BE KEPT SECRET. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER THAN UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, USAF.



COUNTRY Territory of Alaska, U.S.A.		REPORT NO. IR-1-52	(LEAVE BLANK) 9011176
<b>AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT</b>			
SUBJECT Unusual Unidentified Radar Targets			
AREA REPORTED ON Ladd Air Force Base, Alaska		FROM (Agency) Intelligence Directorate, Hq AAC	
DATE OF REPORT 8 February 1952	DATE OF INFORMATION 22 and 23 January 1952	EVALUATION F-6	
PREPARED BY (Officer) TIMOTHY J. FLANAGAN, Capt, USAF Chief, Elect Intel Br		SOURCE Statements by observers of incidents.	
REFERENCES (Control number, directive, previous report, etc., as applicable) None			

SUMMARY: (Enter concise summary of report. Give significance in final one-sentence paragraph. List inclosures at lower left. Begin text of report on AF Form 111-Part II.)

This report contains a narrative statement based on observer reports and on conclusions of preliminary study of the unusual radar targets which appeared near Ladd Air Force Base, Alaska, on 22 and 23 January 1952.

APPROVED:

*Francis H. MacDuff*  
FRANCIS H. MacDUFF  
Lt Col, USAF  
Director of Intelligence

17 Incls (1 ea)

1. Msg, 5001st Composite Wg, 22 Jan 52
2. Ltr, Hq Alaskan Comd, 24 Jan 52
3. Ltr, AAC, 25 Jan 52
4. Rept, 5004th Air Intel Sv Sq, 23 Jan 52
5. Statement, Lt A.L. Boyd, Jr., Controller, F-2
6. Statement, Lt J.C. Frost, Maint, F-2
7. Statement, Lt C.E. Garrett, Plt
8. Statement, Capt V.D. Ramey, Radar Observer
9. Statement, Lt R.R. Diment, Plt
10. Statement, Lt C.A. Hayward, Radar Observer
11. Statement, Capt R.B. Peterson, Plt
12. Statement, Lt C.A. Garrett, Plt
13. Statement, J.S. Bangs, Gen Elec Co Tech Repr
14. Statement, J.S. Bangs, Gen Elec Co Tech Repr
15. Statement, A.G. Wedin, Opr Anlys
16. Statement, Lt G.H. Wilkinson, Controller, F-1
17. Overlay, Ftr Track and Unidentified Track

*Handwritten signatures and initials, including a large 'B' in a circle.*

~~XXXX~~

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

Alaskan Comd, ATTN: J-2  
5001st Composite Wg, ATTN: Wg Intel Off

*Official circular stamp of the Intelligence Directorate, Hq AAC.*



AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM (Agency)	REPORT NO.	PAGE	OF	PAGES
Intelligence Directorate, Hq AAC	IR-1-52	3	3	3

COMMENTS of Preparing Officer:

The following hypotheses are advanced concerning the aforementioned radar targets:

1. That the energy transmitted from F-1 might have reflected from Mt. McKinley in such a manner as to create these radar targets.

Comment: Due to the frequencies and the pulse repetition frequencies of the radar sets involved (AN/CPS-6B at F-1 and F-2, and the AN/APG-33 in the aircraft) it is thought highly improbable that this hypothesis is a valid one for technical reasons.

2. That ionized gases due to meteor activity might have produced these radar targets.

Comment: It is thought that the presence of a meteor southwest of Ladd Air Force Base at approximately 2000Z, 21 January 1952, might have some bearing on the subject. It is not considered likely, in view of Dr. Elvey's statement, that the meteor itself caused this target return. There is the possibility that the ionized gases, which may have been present with the meteor's passage, might have broken into small clouds (irregular masses of ionized gas) and have been floating around in the upper air. One or more of these clouds, being at the mercy of upper air currents, may have drifted into the area of Ladd Air Force Base. Further, the possibility exists that an ionized cloud may give a radar return. The passage of an aircraft near such clouds, such as happened when the fighter broke off the intercept on both nights, would tend to disturb the surrounding air in such a manner as to disperse the ionized cloud. This would tend to explain the aircraft's inability to re-establish radar contact with the target after an intercept pass. The failure of F-2 to contact a target on 23 January 1952 is not explainable.

3. That the activity of the Aurora Borealis might have produced these radar targets.

Comment: Due to the known effect of the Aurora Borealis on radio in this theater, it is thought that some effect on radar also might be experienced. This is believed to be beyond the scientific capabilities of this Command to determine.

*Timothy J. Flanagan*  
TIMOTHY J. FLANAGAN  
Capt, USAF  
Chief, Elect Intel Br

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;  
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DOD DIR 5200.10

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