

1. DATE - TIME GROUP 1.2 May 53 13/04152	2. LOCATION  Pacific Northwest, Washington and Oragon States
J. SOURCE	10. CONCLUSION  RADAR INTERP RESIGN DUN TO MIVERSION
4. NUMBER OF OBJECTS  Hot Stated	Inversion effects on all Radar in area.
5. LENGTH OF OBSERVATION  2 Hours, 21 Himses  6. Type of Observation Air-Intercept Radar Ground-Radar	Several unidentified blips occurred on radar sets, both air borne and ground. A/c attempted interception. Home of the 5 a/c could make visual contact. Tempture inversion noted.
7. COURSE .  Varied  8. PHOTOS	
9. PHYSICAL EVIDENCE	

FTD SEP 63 0-329 (TDE) Provious editions of this form may be used.





UNCLASSIFIED 14 May 1953

LISTING OF PLOTS OF UNKNOWN TRACKS B - 14 - G AND THE INTERCEPT PLOTS
OF PRONTO THITE AND PRONTO BLUE WITH
COORDINATES AND TIMES (2)

#### VIOLATOR TRACK

#### FIGHTER TRACK

Georef Grid	Time	Georef Grid Time (Fronto hite)
1. KB 4848 2. KB 4853 3. KB 4555 4. KC 3902 5. KC 3209 6. KC 2218	0456Z 0500Z 0504Z 0511Z 0515Z 0527Z FADED AT 0536Z	1. NC 1919 05152 2. NC C120 05164 3. MC 4822 05194 4. MC 0932 05242 5. MC 0135 05252 FADED AT 05312

(Pronto Dlue)	
1. NC 2015	05344
2. NC 0115	05352
3. MC 5020	0538Z
4. MC 3221	05402
5. MC 2022	05414
6. LC 4828	05454
7. LC 3030	05462
8. LC 2030	05474
9. LC 1530	0548Z
10. LC 1030	05492
11. LC 0132	05502
12. KC 4838	05514
13. KC 3035	05534
14. FADED	05562
15. KC 1050	0606Z
16. KC 3050	06102
17. KC 4852	06122
18. KC 5854	06142
19. LC 1549	06182
20. LC 3242 21. LC 5038	06224
22. LC 5938 .	06264
23. MC 1032	06272
24. MC 1930	06282
25. MC 2530	06292
26. MC 3824	06302
27. MC 4721	06314
28. NC 0219	06332
29. NC 1018	06342
30. NC 2017	06352
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
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AF548375

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FADLD AT 0636Z



EUGENE NO PQ NO MQ JO KQ LQ PP JP KP NP MP AF548375 UNCLASSIFIED JN 125°LN KN

Matti AID	REPORT NO.	60553	AF548	37
AIR	INTELLIGENCE	NFORMATIC	ON REPORT	11
Unknown Tra	. गुल्या	FROM (Algency)		
Pacific No.	DATE OF INFORMATION		rs, 25th Air Division	Defens
16 May 53		May 53	A-1	
il A. Vosburgh,		25th Air D	ivision (Defense)	
	known Tracks B-14-	NEIL	A. VOSBURGH	
	11/11/11			
	1 11			
1				
Statement - Tate Statement - Rodg Overlay of Trk B	ers -97-G			
Statement - Tate Statement - Rodg	ers -97-G			
Statement - Tate Statement - Rodg Overlay of Trk B Overlay of Trk B	-97-G -14-G			
Statement - Tate Statement - Rodg Overlay of Trk B Overlay of Trk B	ers -97-G			

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S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

AF FORM 112-PART II

# AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

ROM (Ayenep).	IR-25A0-2-5	340				
Hos, 25th Air Division (Def)		PAGE	1	OF	3	PAGES

#### SECTION I (B-97-0) 13 MAY 1953

- 1. Target B-97-G, originating in Pacific ADIZ in KB 5255 at Ohl5Z hours, heading 340° with 6,000 feet altitude and estimated 90 knots ground speed. Altitude and ground speed remained same throughout course.
- 2. Pronto Red ( 1 AI aircraft) was scrambled at Oh332 and was unsuccessful he could not get a visual on the unknown.
- 3. Simpence White (2 Non-AI aircraft vectored in on target) were also unsuccessful.
- 4. Inclosure #1 is a statement by Captain S. D. Tate and Inclosure #2 is a statement by 2nd Lt D. L. Rodgers. Officers were Pronto Red crew.
  - 5. GCI Director was Captain D. V. Jensen, Station P-57.
- 6. Inclosure #3 is a chart containing diagram of the activity. Also included is location of balloon mentioned in Section III, paragraph 4, this report.

#### SECTION II (B-14-G) 13 MAY 1953

111/1

- 1. Target B-14-G, originating in Pacific ADIZ in KB 4848 at 0456Z hours, heading 340° with 6,000 feet altitude and estimated 80 knots ground speed. Altitude and speed remained same throughout course.
- 2. Pronto Blue (1 AI aircraft) scrambled at 0528Z hours and Pronto White (1 AI aircraft) scrambled at 0508Z hours. Captain D. Jarrett (Pronto Blue) and 1st Lt A. Young (Pronto White) both of 317th Fighter Interceptor Squadron were Intercept Pilots. Pronto White had to abort due to radar trouble. Pronto Blue searched area but could not find the Bogie.
  - 3. GCI Director was Captain D. V. Jensen.
  - 4. Inclosure #4 is a chart containing diagram of the activity.

#### SECTION III OTHER PERTINENT FACTORS

- 1. In answer to query, Coast Guard vessels reported sea swells as moving on a course of 050° with swells 9½ feet high having sharp breaking crests moving in at 8 second intervals. Surface winds from North at 4 knots. No visuals on unknowns by three Coast Guard vessels in area. Did see and hear jets.
- 2. Coast Guard, Navy, RCAF and AMIS were coordinated with. All reported no air activity in area. MST reported large vessel in area which was located by radar.
- 3. Neah Bay could at no time paint the unknowns but was painting friendly aircraft.

AF FORM 112-PART II

## AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

FROM ("Lymey)	IR-2540-2-53W					
Hqs, 25th Air Division (Def)	160553	PAGE	2	OF	3	PAGES

- h. Moby Dick Project at Tillamook was checked for balloon activity.
  One balloon was released at Tillamook on Monday evening and moved to ND 5010
  Tuesday A.M. It hovered there at 55,000 feet for few hours until pressure
  area switched and balloon moved in opposite direction to LA 5000 at 0530Z
  hours, 13 May 1953.
  - 5. Wind was from NE at 5,000 feet, 20 knots.
- 6. A Coast Guard radio operator at Westport, Washington reported receiving CW transmissions on 500 kcs that were very weak and unintelligible. Transmissions were intermittent lasting from 30 seconds to 1½ minutes, beginning just prior to 05002 hours and ending shortly after 06002 hours. They were also heard by Department of Transport, Port Hardy Radio Range Station, Vancouver Island. No bearing could be obtained due to weak signal. The FCC monitoring station at Portland was queried as to receipt and reported negative; however, they had been monitoring 500 kcs. The Coast Guard radio operator reported that he thought that there were three different transmitters involved in the signals he was receiving and that it sounded like they were using a technique that can be utilized for homing to effect a rendezvous.
- 7. Major Deckert, Operations Officer of 317th Fighter Interceptor Squadron was sent out in a B-25 around 2300 hours PST. He searched within a 200 mile radius for surface vessels capable of launching or carrying small aircraft. All ships located were determined to be friendly. Visual surveillance was accomplished on several ships after daybreak. On headings of 210° Major Deckert received what is considered to be sea return on radar. On reciprocal (030) he received no pickup. On 210° he was flying directly into (against) the 9½ feet high swells. The swells were crested, thus forming a cup sufficient enough to reflect the radar energy. On the reciprocal course the aircraft was flying with the swells, the crests breaking away from him. This would appear to explain that there would not be enough surface at proper angle to reflect the radar energy.
- 8. There were numerous fishing boats in the area which were painted by the AI interceptors, the B-25 and by Polili.) Ac+w

#### SECTION IV DISCUSSION

1. A study of the alignment of plots provided by station P-57 on these tracks and the report from personnel at the station that the blips looked normal and did not resemble wave blips, leads one to conclude that these were airborne objects. This conclusion can be further substantiated when considering that the sea swell was running in a direction that would result in a very shallow contact angle between the beamed energy and the face of the swells in the vicinity of the unknowns. Therefore, little or no radar energy would be reflected back to the receiving system of the ground station. This conclusion is further substantiated by the results obtained from AI radar when on certain headings during this time period.

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IT MAY NOT BE REPRODUCED IN WHOLE OR IN PART, BY OTHER THAN UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AGENCIES, EXCEPT BY PERMISSION OF THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, USAF.

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AF FORM 112-PART II


### AIR INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION REPORT

OM (Algency)	IR-2540-2-53 W					
Hos, 25th Air Division (Def)	160553	PAGE	3	OF	3	PAGES

- 2. The fact that station P-hh was unable to pick up these tracks when they were within the surveillance capability of their station refutes the conclusion, to some extent, that these were airborne objects. P-hh had completed their weekly maintenance that morning and the set was painting friendly air traffic and numerous fishing boats and some ocean vessels.
- 3. At Oh00Z a radio sonde observation report from Tatoosh Island (Neah Bay) reported a six degree temperature inversion between 1500 and 1700 feet MSL. This factor accounts for P-lik receiving strong returns on ships well out to sea. It was determined during the research calibration tests conducted at P-57 by personnel from USAF, Research-Development Command and University of Texas, that unusual phenomena can and will occur during inversions which can have varied results on radar energy. The energy may be reflected, null areas may develop and blips may appear on scopes when actually no airborne object is present at that location. These specialists were unable to provide proven criteria, at that time, for practical application by the AC&W system. It is noted that site P-44 was below the level of the existing inversion and that if the inversion's altitude was 1500 to 1700 feet in the vicinity of P-57, that site equipment was above the inversion. Such a condition may have developed a null area for P-lik at the Bogey's altitude or P-57 may have been receiving energy reflected from a localized unusual atmospheric condition. Note Captain Tate's comments (Inclosure #1) about target's actions at 2000 feet.
- 4. The Westport Coast Guard station is located at LB 5253. The unknown tracks were within 50 to 100 miles of this station during the time the radio operator was receiving transmissions on 500 kcs. Coast Guard Headquarters at Seattle provided the ADCC information regarding these signals because of ADCC controller's previous request for reports of visual sightings by Coast Guard vessels known to be in vicinity of Track B-97. Portland FCC Monitor Station's inability to read signals on 500 kcs could be attributed to weak signal strength.

#### SECTION V CONCLUSION

- 1. This Headquarters is unable to further evaluate these tracks.
- 2. No firm conclusions can be reached as to identity of subject tracks.




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(CLASSIFICATION)

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



#### STATEMENT


At approximately Ob33Z we (Pronto Red) were scrambled after an unknown ... Vector 270, A 20. Then we were 15 miles past Shelton we contacted Chancellor and given a Vector of 250, Bogey 12 o'clock, 70 mi. At that time we heard Chancellor tryint to work Simpence White onto the Borey without success. Chancellor mave the Bogey's approximate altitude as 6 A, so when we were 20 miles out we started a descent to 5,000 feet. As we closed within h miles, my radio operator said he was picking up something that looked like ground return at that range; however, we found nothing. GCI again brought us in on the Bogey and the radio operator got intermittent contacts and although we throttled right back to 180 K, we overshot the target. The radio operator on the next pass determined that the target was slightly below us so we dropped down to 2,000 feet. He then got some good contacts plus lock-on and as we closed the target broke up into two or three targets, one passing to the port, one slightly sterboard and one dead ahead. He closed to zero range and saw nothing. Due-to-the-action and appearance of the targets, we determined that they were probably chaff. We spent over an hour in the area and got many contacts and lock-ons. As time passed the targets appeared to lose altitude and we looked for them on the surface of the water at 200 feet altitude, using our landing lights. The targets seem to have no movement of their own as we had a large over-take speed on all. If they had been solid targets, we would have seen or collided with some. Two boats in the area we picked up clearly and easily with our weapon.

> S. D. TATE Captain, USAF


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As soon as we were sirborne I started checking the radar. The sat looked good as the ground return was very sharp and distinct. After passing the coastline I picked up a large group of targets, close together making a continuous blob as ground return does. These targets were approximately 12,000 - 15,000 yards out. Chancellor continued to vector us on into the target and when we got into 6,000 - 8,000 yards the individual targets became distinct. They were below us, below 5,000 - 6,000 feet. We throttled right back to 180 - 200 knots and obtained a lock on, overtake over 100 knots. We then went into a hard port turn and broke lock, losing contact at approximately 400 - 500 yards. We flew through, around and locked on several of these contacts. We also made contact with a number of ships and experienced no difficulty getting a visual on them. We believe these contacts were chaff.

D. L. RODCERS



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
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15 May 1953

LISTING OF PLOTS OF HNKNOWN TRACK B-97-G AND THE INTERCEPT PLOTS OF SIXPENCE WHITE 1 AND 2 AND PRONTO RED WITH COORDINATES
AND TIMES (Z)

#### VIOLATOR TRACK

#### FIGHTER TRACK

Georef Grid	Time	Georef Grid (Sixpence #	hite 1)
1. KB 5255 2. KC 4801 3. KC 4309 4. KC 4012 5. KC 4115 6. KC 3518 7. KC 3323 8. KC 2229 9. KC 2033 10, KC 1438 11. KC 0849	04152 04192 04262 04312 04362 04402 04442 04502 04582 05052 05092 FADED AT 05144	1. LC 4805 2. LC 1009 3. KC 5215 4. KC 3520 5. KC 4025 6. KC 3820 7. KC 3230 8. KC 2232 9. KC 3029 10. KC 1042 11. KC 2845 12. KC 5058 13. LD 0901 14. LD 2903 15. MD 1013 16. MD 4306 17. ND 1002 18. NC 4059	04302 04342 04362 04382 04392 04482 04552 05012 05072 05072 05102 05132 05132 05182 05212 05242 05272
A STATE OF THE STA		19. FADE	D AT 0531Z

### (Sixpence Lhite 2)

1. LC 4805	0430Z
2. MC 2535	04372
3. MC 4038	04382
4. MC 5340	04412
5G NC 0650	04432
6. NC 2056	04452
7. ND 3303	04464
8.	FADED AT 04502

1. MC 1022 2. LC 3825 3. LC 1825 4. KC 5626 5. KC 2531 6. KC 1540 7. KC 1241 7. KC 1241 7. KC 1035 10. KC 1035 11. KC 1528 12. KC 1522 13. KC 2022 14. KC 0831 15. KC 0634 16. KC 2040 17. KC 3235 18. KC 4835 19. LC 0138 20. LC 1035 21. LC 5930 22. MC 1525 23. NC 0118 24. NC 1608 26. FADED AT 0614Z		(Pronto Red)
3. LC 1825 4. KC 5626 5. KC 2531 6. KC 1540 7. KC 1241 7. KC 1241 9. KC 0547 10. KC 1035 11. KC 1528 12. KC 1522 13. KC 2022 14. KC 0831 15. KC 0634 16. KC 2040 17. KC 3235 18. KC 4835 19. LC 0138 20. LC 1035 21. LC 5930 22. MC 1525 23. NC 0118 24. NC 1608 25. NC 2804 06132	1. MC 1022	
4. KC 5626 5. KC 2531 6. KC 1540 7. KC 1241 7. KC 1241 7. KC 0547 9. KC 0547 10. KC 1035 11. KC 1528 12. KC 1522 13. KC 2022 14. KC 0831 15. KC 0634 16. KC 2040 17. KC 3235 18. KC 4835 19. LC 0138 20. LC 1035 21. LC 5930 22. MC 1525 23. NC 0118 24. NC 1608 25. NC 2804 06132	2. LC 3825	04502
5. KC 2531 0457Z 6. KC 1540 0501Z 7. KC 1241 0507Z 8. KC 0140 0515Z 9. KC 0547 0528Z 10. KC 1035 0535Z 11. KC 1528 0537Z 12. KC 1522 0539Z 13. KC 2022 0541Z 14. KC 0831 0543Z 15. KC 0634 0545Z 16. KC 2040 0545Z 17. KC 3235 0550Z 18. KC 4835 0551Z 19. LC 0138 0553Z 20. LC 1035 0554Z 21. LC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	3. LC 1825	04512
6. KC 1540 0501Z 7. KC 1241 0507Z 8. KC 0140 0515Z 9. KC 0547 0528Z 10. KC 1035 0535Z 11. KC 1528 0537Z 12. KC 1522 0539Z 13. KC 2022 0541Z 14. KC 0831 0543Z 15. KC 0634 0545Z 16. KC 2040 0548Z 17. KC 3235 0550Z 18. KC 4835 0551Z 19. IC 0138 0553Z 20. IC 1035 0554Z 21. IC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	4. KC 5626	04552
7. KC 1241 0507Z 8. KC 0140 0515Z 9. KC 0547 0528Z 10. KC 1035 0535Z 11. KC 1528 0537Z 12. KC 1522 0539Z 13. KC 2022 0541Z 14. KC 0831 0543Z 15. KC 0634 0545Z 16. KC 2040 0548Z 17. KC 3235 0550Z 18. KC 4835 0551Z 19. IC 0138 0553Z 20. IC 1035 0554Z 21. IC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	5. KC 2531	04572
8. KC 0140 0515Z 9. KC 0547 0528Z 10. KC 1035 0535Z 11. KC 1528 0537Z 12. KC 1522 0539Z 13. KC 2022 0541Z 14. KC 0831 0543Z 15. KC 0634 0545Z 16. KC 2040 0548Z 17. KC 3235 0550Z 18. KC 4835 0551Z 19. LC 0138 0553Z 20. LC 1035 0554Z 21. LC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	6. KC 1540	05012
9. KC 0547 10. KC 1035 11. KC 1528 12. KC 1528 13. KC 2022 14. KC 0831 15. KC 0634 16. KC 2040 17. KC 3235 18. KC 4835 19. LC 0138 20. LC 1035 21. LC 5930 22. MC 1525 23. NC 0118 24. NC 1608 25. NC 2804 06132	7. KC 1241	05072
9. KC 0547 10. KC 1035 11. KC 1528 12. KC 1528 13. KC 2022 14. KC 0831 15. KC 0634 16. KC 2040 17. KC 3235 18. KC 4835 19. LC 0138 20. LC 1035 21. LC 5930 22. MC 1525 23. NC 0118 24. NC 1608 25. NC 2804 06132	8. KC 0140	05152
11. KC 1528 12. KC 1522 13. KC 2022 14. KC 0831 15. KC 0634 16. KC 2040 17. KC 3235 18. KC 4835 19. LC 0138 20. LC 1035 21. LC 5930 22. MC 1525 23. NC 0118 25. NC 2804 06132	9. KC 0547	
11. KC 1528 12. KC 1522 13. KC 2022 14. KC 0831 15. KC 0634 16. KC 2040 17. KC 3235 18. KC 4835 19. LC 0138 20. LC 1035 21. LC 5930 22. MC 1525 23. NC 0118 25. NC 2804 06132	10. KC 1035	0535Z
13. KC 2022 0541Z 14. KC 0831 0543Z 15. KC 0634 0545Z 16. KC 2040 0548Z 17. KC 3235 0550Z 18. KC 4835 0551Z 19. LC 0138 0553Z 20. LC 1035 0554Z 21. LC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	11. KC 1528	
14. KC 0831 0543Z 15. KC 0634 0545Z 16. KC 2040 0548Z 17. KC 3235 0550Z 18. KC 4835 0551Z 19. LC 0138 0553Z 20. LC 1035 0554Z 21. LC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	12. KC 1522	
15. KC 0634 0545Z 16. KC 2040 0548Z 17. KC 3235 0550Z 18. KC 4835 0551Z 19. LC 0138 0553Z 20. LC 1035 0554Z 21. LC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	13. KC 2022	0541Z
16. KC 2040	14. KC 0831	05432
17. KC 3235 0550Z 18. KC 4835 0551Z 19. LC 0138 0553Z 20. LC 1035 0554Z 21. LC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	15. KC 0634	05452
18. KC 4835 0551Z 19. IC 0138 0553Z 20. IC 1035 0554Z 21. IC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	16. KC 2040	C548Z
19. IC 0138 0553Z 20. IC 1035 0554Z 21. IC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 0603Z 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	17. KC 3235	05502
20. IC 1035 05542 21. IC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 06034 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 06114 25. NC 2804 0613Z	18. KC 4835	0551Z
21. LC 5930 0600Z 22. MC 1525 06034 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 06114 25. NC 2804 0613Z	19. LC 0138	0553Z
22. MC 1525 06034 23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 06114 25. NC 2804 0613Z	20. LC 1035	05542
23. NC 0118 0607Z 24. NC 1608 0611Z 25. NC 2804 0613Z	21. LC 5930	0600Z
24. NC 1608 06112 25. NC 2804 0613Z	22. MC 1525	06034
25. NC 2804 0613Z	23. NC 0118	06072
	24. NC 1608	06112
26. FADED AT 0614Z	25. NC 2804	0613Z
	26.	FADED AT 0614Z



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